Files
houseplan-card/custom_components/houseplan/http_api.py
T
Matysh 09b0ba41a5 fix v1.44.4: audit follow-up B2, B5, L4 sub-item
B2: the HTTP upload view failed OPEN when the config entry was
unavailable while the WS path failed closed — both now share one
may_write() policy helper (new auth.py) that denies non-admins when the
policy cannot be read.

B5: _finite now guards room rects, polygon vertices, view_box and
opening coordinates, not just layout positions; the declared
MAX_OPENINGS cap is finally enforced.

L4 (sub-item): every drag pipeline captures the pointer through the
tolerant helper (an inactive pointerId used to kill device/label/resize
drags); decor shapes gained a bounds clamp so they cannot be dragged far
outside the plan and persisted there.

+2 backend tests (16); both changelogs updated in this commit
2026-07-27 14:14:25 +03:00

153 lines
5.6 KiB
Python

"""HTTP endpoint for uploading House Plan manual files.
Files (PDF and the like) are uploaded not over WebSocket (its message size limit
breaks the connection on a large PDF) but via a plain multipart POST — like media in HA itself.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from pathlib import Path
from aiohttp import web
from homeassistant.components.http import HomeAssistantView
try: # KEY_HASS — the modern way to access hass from the aiohttp application
from homeassistant.components.http import KEY_HASS
except ImportError: # older HA versions
KEY_HASS = "hass" # type: ignore[assignment]
from homeassistant.core import HomeAssistant
from .const import CONF_ADMIN_ONLY, CONTENT_URL, FILES_DIR, FILES_URL, PLANS_DIR
from .auth import may_write
from .validation import (
FILE_EXTENSIONS,
MAX_FILE_BYTES,
file_ext,
sanitize_filename,
sanitize_marker_id,
)
_LOGGER = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_CHUNK = 64 * 1024
_MIME = {
".pdf": "application/pdf",
".png": "image/png",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".webp": "image/webp",
".gif": "image/gif",
".txt": "text/plain",
}
class HouseplanContentView(HomeAssistantView):
"""Authenticated read access to plans and marker files (audit B1).
The directories used to be exposed as unauthenticated static paths, so
anyone who could reach the HA endpoint could pull floor plans and uploaded
manuals without logging in. This view keeps the same URLs but requires a
Home Assistant session (or a signed path, which the frontend uses for
<image href> inside the SVG).
"""
url = "/api/houseplan/content/{kind}/{sub}/{name}"
name = "api:houseplan:content"
requires_auth = True
async def get(self, request: web.Request, kind: str, sub: str, name: str) -> web.StreamResponse:
hass: HomeAssistant = request.app[KEY_HASS]
if kind not in ("plans", "files"):
return web.Response(status=404)
safe_sub = sanitize_marker_id(sub)
safe_name = sanitize_filename(name)
if not safe_sub or not safe_name:
return web.Response(status=404)
base = Path(hass.config.path(PLANS_DIR if kind == "plans" else FILES_DIR)).resolve()
# plans live flat in one directory: the sub segment is a placeholder ("_")
path = (base / safe_name if kind == "plans" else base / safe_sub / safe_name).resolve()
# defence in depth: the sanitizers already strip separators
if not str(path).startswith(str(base)):
return web.Response(status=404)
def _read() -> bytes | None:
return path.read_bytes() if path.is_file() else None
blob = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_read)
if blob is None:
return web.Response(status=404)
return web.Response(
body=blob,
content_type=_MIME.get(path.suffix.lower(), "application/octet-stream"),
headers={"Cache-Control": "private, max-age=3600"},
)
class HouseplanUploadView(HomeAssistantView):
"""POST /api/houseplan/upload — save a marker file, return its URL."""
url = "/api/houseplan/upload"
name = "api:houseplan:upload"
requires_auth = True
async def post(self, request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
hass: HomeAssistant = request.app[KEY_HASS]
if not may_write(hass, request.get("hass_user")):
return web.json_response({"error": "unauthorized"}, status=403)
marker_id = "misc"
filename: str | None = None
blob: bytes | None = None
too_large = False
try:
reader = await request.multipart()
async for part in reader:
if part.name == "marker_id":
marker_id = sanitize_marker_id(await part.text())
elif part.name == "file":
filename = part.filename or "file"
# read in chunks, aborting at the limit, instead of loading the whole file into memory
chunks: list[bytes] = []
size = 0
while chunk := await part.read_chunk(_CHUNK):
size += len(chunk)
if size > MAX_FILE_BYTES:
too_large = True
break
chunks.append(chunk)
if too_large:
break
blob = b"".join(chunks)
except Exception as err: # noqa: BLE001
_LOGGER.warning("House Plan upload: multipart read error: %s", err)
return web.json_response({"error": "bad_request"}, status=400)
if too_large:
return web.json_response(
{"error": "too_large", "max_mb": MAX_FILE_BYTES // 1024 // 1024}, status=413
)
if blob is None or not filename:
return web.json_response({"error": "no_file"}, status=400)
ext = file_ext(filename)
if ext not in FILE_EXTENSIONS:
return web.json_response(
{"error": "bad_ext", "allowed": sorted(FILE_EXTENSIONS)}, status=400
)
safe_name = sanitize_filename(filename)
target_dir = Path(hass.config.path(FILES_DIR)) / marker_id
path = target_dir / safe_name
def _write() -> int:
target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path.write_bytes(blob)
return int(path.stat().st_mtime)
mtime = await hass.async_add_executor_job(_write)
return web.json_response(
{"ok": True, "url": f"{CONTENT_URL}/files/{marker_id}/{safe_name}?v={mtime}", "name": filename}
)